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by Lindsay Schlottman 
In October 1971, Lewis and Ruth 
Goldfarb wished to purchase a home in 
Reston, Virginia. The lender who fi-
nanced the purchase required the 
Goldfarbs to obtain title insurance. A title 
examination can only be performed by a 
member of the State Bar in Virginia (all 
Virginia attorneys are required to be 
members of the State Bar). The 
Goldfarbs discovered that all the attor-
neys they contacted charged exactly the 
same fee for the title examination: the 
fee established by the Fairfax County 
Bar Association Minimum Fee 
Schedule, which was closely modeled 
after the State Bar's Schedule, and en-
forced by the State Bar Association. The 
Goldfarbs never found a lawyer who 
would charge a fee lower than the dic-
tated fee; they therefore brought an in-
dividual and class action under the 
Sherman Act** against the State Bar 
and the County Bar alleging that re-
straint of trade or commerce results from 
the establishment and enforcement of 
minimum fee schedules. Goldfarb et al., 
v. Virginia State Bar, et 01., 355 F. Supp. 
491 (1973); 497 F. 2d 1 (1974); 43 L.w. 
4723 (June 16, 1975). (Two other 
county bar associations were sued by the 
Goldfarbs, but they agreed to a consent 
judgment under which they cancelled 
their fee schedules and were enjoined 
from establishing fee schedules in the fu-
ture). 
The District Court found the State Bar 
**The Sherman Act provides in part at 15 U.s.C. 1, 
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwis~, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, is declared to be illegal ... " 
not liable but the County Bar liable 
under the Sherman Act. The basis of this 
lia bility was found as follows: The District 
Court stated that the mere existence of 
the minimum fee schedule restricts 
competition of attorneys by price fixing, 
and that price fixing is one method of re-
straining trade prohibited by the Sher-
man Act. However, this price fixing 
would only be proscribed if it substan-
tially affects interstate commerce, if the 
acts of the lawyers in following minimum 
fee schedules fall within the "trade" 
category," and if these acts are not ex-
cepted from Sherman Act liability under 
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
The District concluded that interstate 
commerce is sufficiently affected to sus-
tain jurisdiction under the Sherman Act 
since a significant portion of home 
financing funds comes from withouHhe 
State of Virginia and most of the lenders 
require a title examination and title in-
surance. The Court further concluded 
that the existence itself of a minimum fee 
schedule places attorneys' services 
within the "trade" category of the Act. 
Parker v. Brown was analyzed to deter-
mine if the acts of the County of State 
Bar would be excepted from Sherman 
Act liability. In Parker, an agricultural 
proration program for the raisin industry 
was established by the state legislature to 
insure stability in the marketing of state 
agricultural commodities. The U. S. 
Supreme Court held that the program 
was permissible, even assuming that had 
the program been adopted by private 
individuals (i.e. no legislative mandate) it 
would have violated the Sherman Act. In 
other words, the Court stressed that the 
Sherman Act does not prohibit state ac-
tion, only private action. In the present 
case, the District Court found that the 
State Bar is engaged in state action 
under Parker for the following reasons: 
the state legislature authorized the state 
Supreme Court to regulate the conduct 
of attorneys and the operation of the 
state Bar; and the State Bar is statutority 
required to investigate and discipline vio-
lators of the standards of conduct man-
dated by the state Supreme Court. The 
County Bar, however, isa private under-
taking. It does not derive any authority 
or efficacy from the state. legislature or 
the state Supreme Court. Bence, under 
Park, the County Bar's actions are not 
state actions. The County Bar's estab-
lishment of a minimum fee schedule is a 
violation of the Sherman Act held the 
Court; the State Bar's role as potential 
enforcer of the County Bar's schedule is 
not a violation. The Court gave another 
season for freeing the State Bar from lia-
bility. The State Bar has only a minor 
role in the fee schedule matter. It does 
have judicial and legislative commands 
to render opinions about and enforce 
violations of ethical conduct; and it has in 
effect stated in two opinions that it is un-
ethical for an attorney to habitually 
charge fees below its minimum fee 
schedule, but the State Bar has never 
disciplined an attorney for violating a 
minimum fee schedule. 
The County Bar and the Goldfarbs 
appealed the District Court's decision 
and these appeals were consolidated be-
fore the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit 
agreed with the District Court that the 
State Bar was immune from Sherman 
Act liability under Parker. However, it 
also found that the County Bar was im-
mune based not on Parker. but on two 
other factors: the "learned profession" 
exemption from the, Sherman Act and 
the lack of interstate commerce restraint. 
The Fourth Circuit readily agreed that 
" ... the fee schedule and the enforce-
ment mechanism supporting it acts as a 
substantial restraint upon competition 
among attorneys practicing in Fairfax 
County." Goldfarb, 497 F. 2d 1, 13 
(1974). Yet the Court stated strongly 
that the practice of a learned profession 
is neither trade nor commerce; therefore 





restraints upon the practice of law are 
not illegal per se. It held that the fee 
schedules are valid insofar as their effect 
is to restrain competition among attor-
neys. 
Although the Fourth Circuit accepted 
the District Court's findings of fact in ref-
erence to home financing and title 
examinations, it reached a conclusion of 
law opposite to that of the District Court. 
Intersate commerce was held to be not 
affected directly and substantially by the 
activities of the County and State Bars 
because law practice is considered an in-
trastate activity and borrowing purchase 
money from an out-of-state lender 
"", makes neither the selling of the house 
nor the supplying of incidental legal ser-
vices an interstate activity." Goldfarb, 
497 F.2d 1, 17 (1974). Thus the impact 
of minimum fee schedules upon in-
terstate is merely incidental to the Bars' 
intrastate activities. 
The Goldfarbs appealed the Fourth 
Circuit's decision to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court reiterated 
that minimum fee schedules constitute 
price fixing. Thus the Court was squarely 
faced with the issue of whether the 
minimum fee schedule for lawyers as 
published by the County Bar and en-
forced by the State Bar violates the 
Sherman Act. 
The decision of the Fourth Circuit that 
interstate commerce was not sufficiently 
affected by the fee schedules was refuted 
by the Supreme Court. The Court 
pointed out that in a practical sense title 
exams are a necessity in real estate 
transactions, that indeed many purchase 
loans are secured from-out-of-state len-
ders, and that a substantial volume of 
commerce is involved. "Where, as a 
matter of law or practical necessity, legal 
services are an integral part of an in-
terstate transaction, a restraint on those 
services may substantially affect com-
merce for Sherman Act purposes." 
Goldfarb, 43 L.W. 4723, 4727. 
The Supreme Court dismissed the 
Fourth Circuit's absolute statement that 
the learned profeSSion is exempted from 
Sherman Act liability by declaring that 
the nature of the legal occupation along 
does not provide sanctuary from the Act. 
The Sherman Act attempts to prevent in-
terstate restraints on commerce by 
" ... every person engaged in business 
whose activities might restrain or 
monopolize commercial intercourse 
among the States." u.s. v. South-
eastem Underwriters Association, 322 
U.S. 533, 553 (1944), cited in Goldfarb, 
43 L. W. 4723, 4728. The practice of law 
does have this business aspect, although 
the Court in a footnote pointed out that 
the fact that a restraint operates upon a 
profession - as distinguished from a 
business - is relevant in determining 
Sherman Act liability. 
Parker was cited by the Supreme 
Court as support for its decision that the 
County Bar's and the State Bar's ac-
tivities are not exempted from Sherman 
Act liability. The minimum fee schedules 
were not authorized specifically by the 
state legislature or the state Supreme 
Court. Parker exemption occurs only 
when anti-competitive conduct is "com-
pelled by direction of the State acting as 
a sovereign." Goldfarb, 43 L. W. 4723, 
4729. The Court found that the State 
Bar is a state agency for limited purposes 
only and that when the State Bar estab-
lished disciplinary measures for violators 
of minimum fee schedules it was en-
gaged in private anticompetitive activity. 
The result of the decision in Goldfarb 
is that minimum fee schedules estab-
lished and enforced by bar associations 
which restrain interstate commerce are 
invalid under the Sherman Act. This de-
cision will not affect the legal profession 
drastically. Many state bar associations, 
including Maryland's, have abandoned 
these schedules; others never had fee 
schedules. The distinction between the 
business and the professional aspects of 
the practice of law somewhat limits this 
Sherman Act liability. The Supreme 
Court specifically stated that the holding 
that certain anticompetitive conduct by 
lawyers results in Sherman Act liability is 
not intended to diminish the state's au-
thority to regulate its profeSSions. Thus, 
future decisions are necessary to deter-
mine whether other aspects of the prac-
tice of law, such as prohibitions against 
advertiSing and solicitation, are within 




former Secretary of the Governor's 
Commission on the Rights of the Handi-
capped completed the panel. Michael 
Steinhardt, author of a definitive Uni-
versity of Baltimore Law Review article 
on educational rights of the handi-
capped served ably as moderator of the 
discussion. 
Concepts and preparation were coor-
dinated by Committee Chairperson An-
thony Gallagher. The panel members 
were informed in advance by the Chair-
person of the questions to be presented, 
ostensibly to avoid surprise or embar-
rassment. However, it was the interplay 
created by the responses to these 
queries that was designed to reveal im-
portant issues and problems that had not 
been preViously aired. 
The budget for the 1975 Project was 
$450.00 of Student Bar Association 
funds. However, the Chairperson was 
able to elicit technical and broadcast 
support from WBAL television's Com-
munity Affairs Director Sidney King and 
none of the allocated monies were 
utilized. The expenses of videotaping on 
17 April, and broadcast on 1 May were 
absorbed by WBAL. 
Grateful appreciation is extended to 
all who participated in the 1975 project. 
Through their cooperation the desired 
mass media impact was accomplished 
and Law Day 1975 became a true com-
munity involvement experience. The 
quality and success of the production is 
evidenced by the First Place Award ex-
tended by the American Bar Associa-
tion. 
(Details ofthe 1976 Law Day Project will 
be submitted for publication in the next 
edition of THE FORUM.) 
